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COMMENT
THE BUCKHANNON STOPS HERE:
BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC.
V. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN RESOURCES SHOULD
NOT APPLY TO THE NEW YORK EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Annabelle Chan*
INTRODUCTION

What do a 102-year-old resident of a West Virginia assisted living
home and a formerly homeless New Yorker have in common? They
will both go uncompensated for effecting governmental policy
changes, due to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources.1 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the "catalyst
theory" of recovery of attorney's fees, making it much more difficult
for the most disadvantaged private litigants to enforce their civil rights
against the government.
In 1996, the West Virginia Office of Health Facility Licensure and
Certification ("OHFLAC") attempted to shut down the Buckhannon
Board and Care Home ("BBCH") for failure to comply with West
Virginia's self-preservation rules, which required residents of
residential board and care homes to be capable of evacuating
themselves without assistance in the event of imminent danger.2 The
orders would have forced BBCH to expel Dorsey Pierce, an alert 102year-old woman who had lived at the home for four years, along with
two other residents, none of whom could comply with the self* J.D. Candidate 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Associate Dean Matthew Diller for his invaluable support and guidance throughout
this process
1. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Buckhannon (No. 99-1848). In three cease and desist
orders, OHFLAC ordered BBCH to close its homes within thirty days, and banned it
from accepting any new residents during the thirty day period. Id.; see also W. Va.
Code §§ 16-5C-2(f), 16-5H-2(f) (1997), repealedby 2003 W. Va. Acts 113.
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preservation provisions.3 After enduring two years of litigation that
ultimately resulted in the repeal of the self-preservation laws,4 which
plaintiffs claimed were violative of the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 ("FHAA")5 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"),6 plaintiffs sued for attorney's fees pursuant to the
"prevailing party" provisions of the FHAA and ADA, whereby "[t]he
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs."7 Plaintiffs sought fees under the "catalyst
theory," which recognizes litigants as "prevailing parties" when they
achieve a desired result because their lawsuit brings about a
"voluntary change in the defendant's conduct."' Despite acceptance
of this theory of recovery by nearly every circuit to consider the issue,'
the Fourth Circuit had previously rejected the argument," and in this
case affirmed the district court's denial of fees in an unpublished, per
curiam opinion." The Supreme Court opted to follow the Fourth
Circuit's minority stance, invalidating the catalyst theory, and thereby
making it much more difficult for plaintiffs like Dorsey Pierce to
3. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Buckhannon (No. 99-1848).
4. 2003 W. Va. Acts 113.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2000).

6. Id. §§ 12101-213.
7. Id. §§ 3613(c)(2), 12205.
8. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that the "catalyst test accords well with long-held notions of prevailing
parties"); Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 (1st Cir. 1999)
(recognizing the catalyst theory as a "practical test for discerning victory"); Payne v.
Bd. of Educ. Cleveland City Sch., 88 F.3d 392, 397-400 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying the
catalyst theory to claims for attorney's fees under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act); Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995) (opting not
to follow explicitly the Fourth Circuit, and permitting recovery for attorney's fees
based on the catalyst theory); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that "an award of attorney's fees under section 1988 may be warranted
where the litigation leads to a favorable result, even if the case does not culminate in a
final judgment"); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1, 17
F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs could recover attorney's fees as
prevailing parties under the catalyst theory unless the lawsuit was frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541,
548 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that "the Supreme Court has eschewed technical
considerations and instead has followed what is essentially a result-oriented
approach" in identifying prevailing parties); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th
Cir. 1994) (electing to follow the majority of circuits in accepting the catalyst theory,
as opposed to the Fourth Circuit); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994)
(reiterating that "plaintiffs who attain the relief they seek through defendants'
voluntary action may qualify for fees by way of the catalyst theory"), all overruled by
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.
10. S-1 & S-2 By & Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49
(4th Cir. 1994).
11. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., No. 99-1424, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 720, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000), affd, 203
F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
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obtain attorney's fees
in spite of the socially beneficial results their
2
litigation produces.'

Two years later, Henry Wittlinger, a formerly homeless New
Yorker, felt firsthand the far-reaching reverberations of Buckhannon.
Wittlinger received both federal and state public assistance at a
Manhattan mail drop for the homeless until June 1995, when he
moved into an apartment. 3 Even after notifying the New York City

Department of Social Services ("DSS") of his change of address,
however, the DSS continued to send Wittlinger's notices of job

availability to the homeless mail drop. 4 Consequently, he did not
receive the letters, failed to respond to them, and the DSS
subsequently terminated his benefits. 5 After two administrative
hearings and two article 78 petitions, 6 DSS finally restored his social
security benefits, which it had mistakenly withheld as a result of an
administrative error. 7 Accordingly, the New York Supreme Court
dismissed the second article 78 petition as moot. 8 Wittlinger argued
he was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to (1) the fee-shifting
provision for "prevailing parties" under the New York State Equal
Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 9 and (2) his qualification as a
12. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
13. In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (N.Y. 2003).
14. Id.
15. Id. The Work Experience Program, through which Wittlinger received his
benefits, required compliance with employment provisions. Id.
16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 2003). Article 78 petitions involve a review of
a final determination or order of the state. Id.
17. Wittlinger, 786 N.E.2d at 1272.
Wittlinger requested an administrative
hearing, which prompted the State Department of Social Services to reverse the
DSS's decision to discontinue Wittlinger's assistance, and reinstate his benefits on
January 3, 1996. Id. Less than two months later, the DSS again sent a job availability
notice to the Manhattan mail drop, and then cancelled Wittlinger's benefits when he
failed to respond to it. Id. Wittlinger again requested an administrative appeal, but
this time the state affirmed the termination of his benefits. Id. In September 1996,
Wittlinger initiated an article 78 petition in order to reverse the decision terminating
his benefits, after which the state stipulated to grant him a de novo administrative
hearing, and in September 1999 the state found the DSS improperly denied him
benefits. Id. Accordingly, the state ordered the DSS to pay Wittlinger benefits
totaling over $15,000. Id. Nevertheless, Wittlinger did not receive any of these
benefits, despite three state orders to comply with the decision. Id. In response,
Wittlinger brought yet another article 78 proceeding in November 1999 to compel the
DSS to comply with the September 1999 administrative determination. Id.
The DSS had sent notice of the article 78 decision to the wrong public
assistance center for issuance of funds. The Amsterdam Public Assistance Center,
which had been assigned Wittlinger's case, closed in 1997 and became a Division of
AIDS Services Center, and the DSS sent the notice there instead of Center 13, where
Wittlinger's case had been re-assigned. Id. at 1272 n.2. On December 1, 1999, DSS
informed the state that Wittlinger's benefits would be available "'hopefully by
tomorrow."' Id. at 1272. Over the next week, he received $12,712.50 of retroactive
benefits, on December 31, 1999, he received $1,175, and finally on February 2, 2000,
he received the remaining $1,184 of benefits. Id. at 1272-73.
18. In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 735 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 2001).
19. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600-8605. (McKinney 2003). In relevant part, the EAJA
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"prevailing party" under the catalyst theory, since his article 78
petition had caused the DSS to release his benefits. 2z The New York
Supreme Court denied attorney's fees, and the Appellate Division
affirmed the decision, relying on two grounds: first, that the state's
position was substantially justified, and second, that after
Buckhannon, the catalyst theory was "no longer a viable basis for an
award of attorneys' fees. 21 The Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed the decision on the first ground, but declined to rely on the
second.22
Ultimately, the decision prevented Wittlinger from
recovering any of the attorney's fees he had incurred over three years
of litigation and three actions against the DSS to correct their
administrative errors.2 3 Henry Wittlinger's plight may soon become a
commonplace scenario if New York courts refuse to recognize the
catalyst theory's continuing applicability to the state EAJA.
The New York legislature enacted the EAJA in response to the
difficulties faced by the poor in obtaining legal counsel, which had
reached "crisis proportions" and "jeopardize[d] both the welfare of
poor persons and the legitimacy of the legal system itself. ' 24 The
primary purpose of the New York EAJA is to "create a mechanism
authorizing the recovery of counsel fees and other reasonable
expenses" by low-income parties "in certain actions against the state
of New York. '25 Similarly, the catalyst theory permitted recovery of
attorney's fees when a party achieved the aims sought in a lawsuit
without formal judgment, and thus facilitated litigation by low- and
moderate-income parties. Prior to Buckhannon and Wittlinger, this
scheme provided access to the judicial process and a check
on
26
unjustified government action by "private attorneys general.
The Wittlinger Court of Appeals' reluctance to endorse the
Appellate Division's reliance on Buckhannon indicates that
Buckhannon's applicability to the state EAJA is still an open question
in New York. This Comment argues that although federal courts have
applied Buckhannon to the federal EAJA, 7 the unique, inherent
provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees and
other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state,
unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8601(a).
20. Wittlinger, 786 N.E.2d at 1273.
21. In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 735 N.Y.S.2d 382,382-83 (App. Div. 2001).
22. Wittlinger, 786 N.E.2d at 1274.
23. Id.
24. Letter from the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA"), to Governor
Cuomo, reprinted in 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336 (urging Governor Mario Cuomo to
approve the EAJA).
25. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae NYSBA at 6, Wittlinger,
(No. 2003-0005).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 39-42.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000); see Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288
F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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safeguards built into the New York EAJA, as well as mounting public

policy concerns about providing ordinary citizens a meaningful
opportunity to exercise their rights, and our interest in preserving a
valuable check on government behavior, counsel against applying

Buckhannon to the state statute.
Part I discusses the evolution of the catalyst theory, including the

development of fee-shifting provisions under the American rule, the
federal and New York EAJAs, the development of the catalyst

theory, the Fourth Circuit's opinion that split from other circuits, and
finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon. Part II explores
Buckhannon's impact on the federal and state EAJAs, and how courts

have struggled to define what constitutes an action giving rise to
attorney fee recovery. Part III argues that the proper resolution to
this problem is to exempt the New York EAJA from the reach of
Buckhannon, or, in the alternative, apply Buckhannon in a limited

fashion by deeming private settlements sufficient to recover attorney's
fees.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEE-SHIFTING POLICY

A. The American Rule
Under the American rule, each party pays its own litigation costs
regardless of the outcome of the case.2 8 Though originally intended to
encourage plaintiffs to litigate without fear of fee liability to
defendants, the American rule eventually became a "barrier between
poorer clients and attorneys who were unwilling to accept the
financial risk of a suit."2 9 In response, courts fashioned fee-shifting
exceptions to the American rule based on the private attorney general
principle.3" Under the private attorney general principle, courts
permit the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees where the
lawsuit a) vindicates the private litigant's rights, and b) benefits
28. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1569 (1993). In contrast,
under the English rule, "counsel fees are regularly allowed to the prevailing party."
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Some
commentators argue that the English rule reduces the total amount of litigation by
promoting settlements. See generally, Mark S. Stein, The English Rule With Client to
Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Appraisal, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 603, 603 n.5
(1995).
29. Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme CourtCommon Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 973, 976 (2002); see generally
Martin Patrick Averill, "Specters" and "Litigious Fog?": The Fourth Circuit
Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of
Educ. of N.C., 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2245, 2252 (1995).
30. Macon Dandridge Miller, Comment, Catalysts as PrevailingParties Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1347, 1349 (2002); see also Charles R.
Haywood, Comment, The Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 985, 988 (1994).
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society at large.3 1 In 1975, however, the Supreme Court re-examined
the origins of the American rule, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,32 and concluded that it is impermissible for courts
to shift fees without congressional authority.33 The Court reasoned
that although Congress had itself created several statutory exceptions
to the American rule, and had not explicitly repealed the judiciallyfashioned exceptions, this did not extend "any roving authority to the
Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the
courts might deem them warranted."3 In response, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197631 to "preserve
the private enforcement of public policy"36 and secure "effective
access to the judicial process" for civil rights litigants. 7 Four years
later, Congress drastically expanded the scope of fee-shifting
exceptions to the American rule with the EAJA of 1980.38
B. The FederalEqual Access to JusticeAct
In relevant part, the federal EAJA provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any civil costs awarded pursuant to
subsection (a) incurred by that party in any civil action ...unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.39
Perhaps in reaction to the deregulation of the 1980s, the EAJA
expanded fee-shifting policy in two important ways: first, the statute
waived the government's general immunity from being assessed
attorney's fees, where before there were only discrete exceptions; and
second, it affirmatively sanctioned the award of fees to parties
prevailing against the government in non-tort civil litigation and
adversarial administrative adjudications. n
Congress recognized that the increased bureaucracy and the
"deterrent effect created by [an] inability to recover fees against the
31. Loring, supra note 29, at 975-76; see also Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137,
1139 (1st Cir. 1975) (granting attorney's fees to prisoners whose civil rights litigation
had "served the public interest"), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975)
(vacating the lower court's decision "in light of Alyeska").
32. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
33. Id. at 247.
34. Id. at 260.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
36. Miller, supra note 30, at 1350; see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 app. at 4351 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing federal fee-shifting statutes).
37. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000); see Haywood, supra note 30, at 990.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
40. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justicefrom State "Equal Access to
JusticeActs?," 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 547, 548, 554 (1995).
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Government" could allow the government to "coerce compliance with
its position."'" Appreciating the expense of vindicating one's rights,

especially against a formidable adversary with far greater resources
such as the United States, Congress intended to "diminish the
deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against,
governmental action"42 by placing
the federal government and civil
43
litigants on more equal footing.
A private litigant must meet four threshold requirements before
recovering fees under the federal EAJA:4 4 (1) the claimant must
demonstrate that it is an eligible party;4 5 (2) the claimant must qualify
as a "prevailing party"; (3) the claimant must show that the
government's position is not substantially justified; and (4) there must
be no special circumstances that make an award unjust. 46 Soon after
the enactment of the federal EAJA, many states adopted similar
statutes, including New York. 7
C. The New York Equal Access to Justice Act
Enacted in 1989, the New York legislature intended the EAJA to
"encourage individuals, small businesses, and not for profit
corporations to challenge state action when it lacks substantial
justification by allowing [individuals] to recover fees and litigation49
expenses."46 The Act was passed soon after the Marrero Committee

41. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 9 (1980), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990.
42. EAJA, 96 Pub. L. No. 481, § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). The statute was
predicated on Congress's finding "that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations,
labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending
against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in
securing the vindication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative
proceedings." See id. § 202(a).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 9-10.
44. As a procedural matter, the claimant must submit an application for fees
within thirty days of final judgment explaining why he is a "prevailing party," setting
forth the amount sought, and alleging that the position of the government was
unjustified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
45. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
46. Id. § 2412 (d)(1)(A).
47. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600 (McKinney 2003); Olson, supra note 40, at 554 n.36.
48. Memorandum from the New York State Assembly 1, reprinted in 1989 N.Y.
Legis. Ann. 336.
49. See generally The Marrero Comm. Report (1989) (on file with Hon. Victor
Marrero Esq. and the Brooklyn Law School Library). Headed by Judge Sol
Wachtler, the Marrero Committee conducted a three year survey of 10,482 New York
attorneys, documenting changes in the volume and nature of their pro bono work.
The committee's findings suggested that the recoverability of at least some attorney's
fees was a major concern for most lawyers in small to midsize firms. Brief of Amicus
Curiae NYSBA at 7, In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2003) (No. 20030005).
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issued a report revealing that the problem of underrepresented low-

income individuals had reached "crisis proportions."5

New York's EAJA mirrors the intent of the federal EAJA,5' though

the state statute departs from its federal model when defining the
scope of private litigants eligible for recovery of fees, and the degree
of success a plaintiff must achieve to recover fees. While the central

fee-shifting language is virtually identical to the federal EAJA,5 2 New
York's EAJA contains more restrictions on eligible parties than the
federal EAJA. The New York EAJA only allows plaintiffs who have
a net worth of less than $50,000 (excluding the value of their primary

residence), owners of businesses with fewer than 100 employees, and
not-for-profit corporations to recover attorney's fees.53 In contrast, the
federal EAJA considers any litigant whose net worth does not exceed

$2,000,000, and owners of an unincorporated business, partnership,
corporation or, association; a unit of local government; or an
organization with a net worth less than $7,000,000 eligible to recover

attorney's fees. 54 These distinctions prompted then-Governor Cuomo
to approve the bill despite his rejection of previous bills with similar
purposes.55
Further, the federal and New York EAJAs define "final judgment"
differently. 56 Whereas the federal EAJA defines final judgment as "a
judgment that is final and not appealable and includes an order of
settlement, 57 the state EAJA defines final judgment as "a judgment

50. Letter from the NYSBA, to Governor Cuomo, reprinted in 1989 N.Y. Legis.
Ann. 336 (urging approval of the EAJA).
51. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600, with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The New York EAJA
was meant to allow recovery on terms "similar to the provisions of federal law
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) and the significant body of case law that has evolved
thereunder." Id.; see also Memorandum from Governor Cuomo, reprinted in 1989
N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336 (noting that the statute was enacted to "improv[e] access to
justice for individuals and businesses who may not have the resources to sustain a
long legal battle against an agency that is acting without justification").
52. Like the federal version, the New York EAJA states that:
except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by
such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds
that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8601(a).
53. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(d).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
55. Memorandum from Governor Cuomo, reprintedin 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336.
Cuomo explained that the present EAJA was different because (1) it contained
appropriate restraints on the eligibility of individuals and organizations that could
recover fees; (2) it would not deter "good faith agency action" thanks to the
"substantially justified" prong; and (3) it contained limits on the amount of fees that
could be awarded. Id.
56. See Wright v. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Serv., No. 2002-5389,
2003 WL 21665633, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2003).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
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that is final and not appealable, and settlement,"5 8 noticeably

excluding the federal version's "order of" language.
Though the New York and federal EAJAs may differ as to some of

the necessary qualifications for a litigant seeking to shift fees, both
statutes permit recovery only by a "prevailing party."5 9 While the
federal EAJA is silent on the definition of "prevailing party,"6 the
New York EAJA describes a prevailing party as a "plaintiff or
petitioner in the civil action against the state who prevails in whole or

in substantial part where such party and the state prevail upon

separate issues."61 The New York Court of Appeals refined this
definition: A prevailing party is "a plaintiff who can show that it
succeeded in large or substantial part by identifying the original goals
of the litigation and by demonstrating the comparative substantiality
'
of the relief actually obtained."62
The New York legislature also
specifically noted that the EAJA was to be interpreted consistently
with the federal EAJA and the "significant body of case law that has
evolved thereunder., 63 Central to this case law was a near unanimous
endorsement of the catalyst theory, which courts developed as a

common law means to more effectively implement the private
attorneys general policy behind the EAJA.
D. PrevailingParties
Both the federal and New York EAJAs award fees to a "prevailing

party;" a term that has been the subject of much litigation. 64 The

58. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(c).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8601(a).
60. The federal EAJA does not provide an explicit definition of "prevailing
party," and instead refers to existing case law under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act for determinations of whether a party qualifies as "prevailing" under the
Equal Access to Justice Act." See Grand Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of
Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154, 1166-67 (D. I11.
1982).
61. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(f).
62. N.Y. State Clinical Lab. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kaladjian, 649 N.E.2d 811 (N.Y. 1995).
63. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600.
64. Much of the controversy over the term "prevailing party" has arisen in the
context of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(2000). According to the legislative history of § 1988, a prevailing party need not
obtain a favorable "final judgment following a full trial on the merits." H.R. Rep. No.
94-1558, at 7 (1976). The Senate Report to § 1988 confirmed this, stating that,
"parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a
consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5912. Despite this seemingly plain language,
courts have struggled with defining "prevailing party." In Hanrahanv. Hampton, the
Supreme Court limited the application of the rule, granting relief without a final
judgment, permitting it only where a party has "established his entitlement to some
relief on the merits of his claims, either in the trial court or on appeal." 446 U.S. 754,
757 (1980) (per curiam). In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court defined
"prevailing party" under § 1988 as a party that "'succeed[s] on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."' 461
U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
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central inquiry revolves around what degree of success or relief a
party must obtain before a court may deem it "prevailing."
1. Development of the Catalyst Theory
First articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,65 the catalyst theory posits that courts may
consider a litigant a "prevailing party" if he or she has received some
of the relief sought by the lawsuit, regardless of whether there has
been a judicially-sanctioned resolution.66 Under the catalyst theory,
courts may deem attorney's fees justified when the plaintiff's suit acts
as a catalyst in prompting the defendant to take action to meet the
plaintiff's claim, even in the absence of judicial mandate.67 Courts
developed various standards for identifying a "prevailing party," but
the three-part test outlined in Justice Ginsburg's Buckhannon dissent
is representative.6 8 Justice Ginsburg would have required that a
plaintiff demonstrate (1) receipt of some benefit sought in the lawsuit;
(2) that the suit stated a claim that was not frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless; and (3) that the suit constituted the
substantial cause or
69
catalyst of defendant's acts that provided relief.
Twelve other circuits adopted the catalyst doctrine,70 and the
Supreme Court has
generally recognized wide latitude in defining
"prevailing party."7 1 Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court
has held that a party obtaining a consent decree or favorable
settlement qualifies as a "prevailing party";7" a plaintiff who wins a
1978), overruled by Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2002)); cf Dawson
v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979); Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279-81. The Hensley
Court made Hanrahan'sstandards for prevailing parties "applicable in all cases in
which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party."' Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433 n.7.
65. 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970).
66. Id. The Parham court concluded that "[a]lthough we find no injunction
warranted here, we believe Parham's lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the
appellee to take action ....In this sense, Parham performed a valuable public service
in bringing this action... [and] Parham is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees ....
"
67. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (noting that the "legislative history strongly
suggests that a plaintiff who is partially successful in achieving the relief sought may
still receive an award," and ultimately concluding that "plaintiffs may be considered
'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit").
68. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 627-28 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); accord Nadeau, 581 F.2d
at 281 (requiring that a plaintiff's claim (1) cause the defendant to change a position;
and (2) that the claim be legally colorable).
69. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28.
70. See Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources: To the PrevailingParty Goes
the Spoils... and the Attorney's Fees!, 36 Akron L. Rev. 363, 377 n.63 (2003)
(collecting cases that endorsed the catalyst theory up to 1993).
71. Id. at 372-73.
72. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (holding that plaintiff's settlement
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judgment on at least some of the merits is a "prevailing party," as long
as he can demonstrate "the settling of some dispute which affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff';7 3 declaratory
judgments constitute relief when they affect the defendant's behavior
toward the plaintiff;74 a party need not prevail on a central issue in the
litigation to be a prevailing party where plaintiff can "point to a
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between
itself and the defendant";7 5 and plaintiffs who win even nominal
damages are prevailing parties. 7 6 As of 1989, the year the New York
EAJA was enacted, the Supreme Court held that the "touchstone of
the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the
in a manner which Congress sought to
legal relationship of the parties
77
promote in the fee statute.

The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Farrarv. Hobby,78 however,
threw doubt on this relatively coherent approach to identifying
"prevailing parties." While Farrarexplicitly recognized the line of

with Connecticut's Aid to Families with Dependent Children did not disqualify her
from seeking attorney's fees under § 1988).
73. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). The Court recognized that when a
lawsuit "produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff all or
some of the relief he sought through a judgment.., the plaintiff is deemed to have
prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor," but ultimately
denied attorney's fees to the claimant, who had litigated to judgment and lost on all
claims against the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute. Id. at 760-61, 763.
74. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 2 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that private
litigants are not entitled to attorney's fees "unless the requesting party prevails," and
concluding that because one of the claimants had died, and the other had been
released from custody, they did not receive the benefit of the defendants' changed
behavior, and therefore were not "prevailing parties").
75. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792
(1989). The Court rejected the district court's insistence that a party must prevail on
a central issue before being entitled to collect attorney's fees, and instead re-affirmed
the Hensley standard-in which plaintiff need only succeed on any significant issue in
litigation. Id. Ultimately, the Court found that plaintiffs' vindication of their First
Amendment rights qualified them as prevailing, even though this was only a partial
victory. Id.
76. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (holding that prevailing parties must
obtain at least some relief on the merits of their claims and an enforceable judgment
against the defendant, or a consent decree, or settlement).
77. Garland,489 U.S. at 792-93.
78. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). Plaintiff sued defendants for monetary and injunctive
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2000), alleging deprivation of liberty and
property without due process by means of conspiracy and malicious prosecution
aimed at closing plaintiff's school. Id. at 106. The district court found that even
though all defendants except Hobby had conspired against plaintiff, and Hobby had
deprived plaintiff of his civil rights, neither of these grounds constituted the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id. A divided Fifth Circuit reversed the subsequent fee
award against one of the defendants, finding that the insignificant nominal award was
a "technical victory," and a meaningless change in his legal relationship with Hobby.
Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court
found the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that technical victories, like nominal damages,
did not qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party. Farrar,506 U.S. at 115-16.
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Supreme Court cases that tacitly endorsed the catalyst theory, 79 and its
main holding merely confirmed that while "the 'technical' nature of a
nominal damages award or any other judgment does not affect the
prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded
under § 1988. "8 The opinion also contained language that would
come to be widely disputed. In dicta, the FarrarCourt stated that
"[n]o material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties
occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment,

consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.1 81 This ruling
effectively shifted the focus in a "prevailing party" inquiry from the
defendant's behavior toward a litigant, to their legal relationship.82
This language would lead the Fourth Circuit to challenge the validity
of the catalyst theory, even though Farrardid not employ it.83
2. The Split
The Fourth Circuit departed from the majority of circuits' approval
of the catalyst theory in a divided en banc decision delivered on
rehearing in S-1 & S-2 By & Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Board of
Education of North Carolina.'4 The majority of the court held that in

the wake of Farrar, "[a] person may not be a 'prevailing party'
plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 except by virtue of having obtained an
enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of
the legal relief sought in a § 1983 action. '85 Even though "most courts
of appeals held that [the Farrar] dicta provided merely an
inexhaustive list of possible prevailing party postures and continued to
interpret the definition of prevailing party to include the catalyst

79. Farrar,506 U.S. at 111-12 (referencing Garland,489 U.S. at 792-93; Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 764 (1987); Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980)).
80. Id. at 114.
81. Id. at 113.
82. See Loring, supra note 29, at 984 (citing Farrar,506 U.S. at 116).
83. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 627 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Farrardid not
implicate a catalytic effect).
84. 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Parents of handicapped children
enrolled in Asheboro, North Carolina schools filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
the city and state board of education, alleging that the policy on reimbursing tuition
violated the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000). S1
& S2, 21 F.3d at 50. After the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
the defendants appealed. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs settled with
some of the defendants. Id. The court dismissed all claims as moot. Id. at 50-51. The
district court and court of appeals awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs because the
state had changed its tuition reimbursement policy under the threat of losing its
federal funding from the United States Department of Education. Id. at 51. On
rehearing en banc, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed,
declaring the catalyst theory invalid. Id.
85. Id. at 51.
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theory,,86 the Fourth Circuit chose to invalidate the catalyst theory,
holding that "[t]he fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for
post-litigation changes in a defendant's conduct cannot suffice to
establish plaintiff as a prevailing party. 'Catalyst theory,' allowing
that result, is no longer available for that purpose. '87 But even after
the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the catalyst theory, nine other circuits
continued to recognize it.8 8 Nevertheless, seven years later, the
Supreme Court chose to follow the Fourth Circuit's splintering
precedent. 9
E. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources
1. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiffs Buckhannon Board & Care Home ("BBCH"), Dorsey
Pierce (a BBCH resident), the Residential Board and Care
Association, and other similarly situated homes sought attorney's fees
after their suit against the West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources9" prompted the repeal of self-preservation laws9
allegedly violative of the FHAA 92 and the ADA. 9' Pursuant to the
fee-shifting provisions of the FHAA94 and ADA, 95 plaintiffs claimed
to be "prevailing parties" under the catalyst theory, but the district
court denied their request for attorney's fees. 96 Although most other
courts of appeals recognized the catalyst theory, the Fourth Circuit
did not, and affirmed the denial of attorney's fees. 97 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among circuits over the
validity of the catalyst theory as applied to the FHAA and the ADA. 98
86. Loring, supra note 29, at 984.

87. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d. at 51.
88. See Stanley, supra note 70, at 378-79 n.70.
89. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
90. Id. at 600-01.
91. 2003 W. Va. Acts 113 (repealing W. Va. Code § 16-5H (2002)).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).

93. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
94. Id. § 3613(c)(2) (providing in relevant part that "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee and costs").
95. Id. § 12205 (providing in relevant part that "the court ... in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation
expenses, and costs").
96. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., No. 99-1424, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 720, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000).
97. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 2000).
98. The Court noted that it had never directly addressed the issue before,
although (1) "[d]ictum in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987), alluded to the
possibility of attorney's fees where 'voluntary action by the defendant.., affords the
plaintiff all or some of the relief.., sought,"' and (2) the Fourth Circuit relied on
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2. The Majority Opinion

In a five-four decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision.9 9

Relying on Black's Law

Dictionary, which defines "prevailing party" as a "party in whose
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages
awarded,"'" and after reviewing its prior treatment of "prevailing

party," the Court concluded that as a prerequisite to recovery of fees,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a "material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties."1 °1 According to the Court, the catalyst
theory did not satisfy this requirement because it permitted recovery

"where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal

relationship of the parties."'0 2 Moreover, the Court found that "[a]
defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change."103
Petitioners argued that the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act"° sustained a broad reading of
"prevailing party" that accommodated the catalyst theory. 105 The
Court, however, dismissed this legislative history as "at best
ambiguous." 0 6
The Court viewed skeptically petitioners' public policy argument,
that without the catalyst theory defendants could unilaterally moot an
action before judgment to avoid paying attorney's fees, and therefore
"deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing
suit,"'0 7 noting that such a scenario "only materializes in claims for
equitable relief, for so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for
Farrar to reject the catalyst theory, despite the fact Farrar "involved no catalytic
effect." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.5 (2001) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 194 (2000)).
99. Id. at 610.
100. Id. at 603; Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999). For an illuminating
examination of the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries for statutory interpretation,
see Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 Fordham L. Rev.
2177 (2003).
101. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,792-93 (1989)).
102. Id. at 605.
103. Id.
104. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908.
Petitioners argued that "the phrase 'prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to
the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits," and
that "parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through
a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at
607 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5).
105. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607.
106. Id. at 608.
107. Id.
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damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case."'
The Court then invalidated the catalyst theory. 10 9

8

3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that preservation of the
catalyst theory would result in the very same public policy inequities
the dissent and petitioners claimed it would prevent."'
Acknowledging that both the dissent and majority's positions will
from time to time result in unfairness because the "former sometimes
rewards the plaintiff with a phony claim... [and] the latter sometimes
denies fees to the plaintiff with a solid case whose adversary slinks
'
away on the eve of judgment,"1 11
Scalia nevertheless opted for the
latter scenario, noting that "the evil of the former far outweighs the
evil of the latter."11 2 He was principally concerned with the low
threshold of merit plaintiffs need to establish before becoming
entitled to recover attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA:
Justice Scalia feared that "the wannabe-but-never-was plaintiff could
'
recover fees."113
Scalia also pointed out that the public policy concerns raised by the
dissent actually cut both ways; the dissent's fear that the majority's
decision will "impede access to court for the less well-heeled," did not
take into account that "the catalyst theory also harms the 'less wellheeled,' putting pressure on them to avoid the risk of massive fees by
abandoning a solidly defensible case early in litigation."' 1 4 Scalia
concluded that where the catalyst theory might coerce either party to
settle prematurely, the majority correctly eliminated it with respect to
the FHAA and ADA.
4. The Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer offered a vastly different interpretation of "prevailing party,"
one that relies more on contextual considerations 5 such as circuit

108. Id. at 608-09. The Court also briefly noted some countervailing policy
considerations-namely that defendants would be disincentivized from voluntarily
changing possibly legal behavior because their "'potential liability for fees in this kind
of litigation can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than, their
potential liability on the merits,"' but refused to base its rejection of the catalyst
theory on public policy. Id. at 608 (quoting Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986)).
109. Id. at 610.
110. See id. at 610-22 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 618.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 619.
114. Id. at 620.
115. The dissent underscored that "[i]n prior cases, we have not treated Black's
Law Dictionary as preclusively definitive; instead, we have accorded statutory terms,
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precedent,
legislative intent, statutory comparisons, and plain
116
English.
The dissent first criticized the majority's departure from the wellestablished circuit precedent of applying the catalyst theory to federal
fee-shifting statutes, and its decision to follow the Fourth Circuit's
rejection of the catalyst theory. " ' The dissent reasoned that the
majority's approach would "allow[] a defendant to escape a statutory
obligation to pay a plaintiff's counsel fees, even though the suit's merit
led the defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on,
to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought
in the complaint.""' According to the dissent, the effects of such an
interpretation of "prevailing party" were clearly contrary to the
legislative intent behind fee-shifting statutes." 9
Citing the House and Senate reports for the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Awards Act of 1976,12° the dissent highlighted the motivating
force behind the statute: "to ensure that nonaffluent plaintiffs would
have 'effective access' to the Nation's courts to enforce civil rights
laws." 12' More importantly, as the dissent underscored, the legislative
history provides that "[f]or purposes of the award of counsel fees,
parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining
relief."'22
In support of awarding fees without an enforceable judgment, the
dissent contrasted the "prevailing party" language with other statutes
that address fee-shifting. 2 For example, the dissent pointed to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), which provides that
fee awards for prisoners must be "proportionately related to the court
including legal 'term[s] of art,'.., a contextual reading." Id. at 628-29 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
116. See id. at 622-44.
117. See id. at 625-27 (criticizing the majority's reliance on Farrarwhen "the issue
[of catalyst theory] 'was not presented for this Court's decision in Farrar"'(citation
omitted)).
118. Id. at 622.
119. In response to the majority's contention that the legislative history was "at
best ambiguous," id. at 607-08, the dissent averred that the majority's "constricted
definition of 'prevailing party,' and consequent rejection of the 'catalyst theory,'
impede[d] access to court for the less well-heeled, and shr[u]nk the incentive
Congress created for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general," id.
at 622-23.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
121. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)).
122. Id. at 637 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912)). The dissent also observed that the House report
specifically supports awarding fees for informal relief: "After a complaint is filed, a
defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award
fees even though it might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as
an injunction, is needed." Id. at 638 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 7).
123. Id. at 629-30.
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ordered relief for the violation." 124 The dissent argued that if
Congress had intended to require a court judgment before plaintiffs
could collect fees under the FHAA and the ADA, then it would have
foreclosed recovery without judgment, as it did in the PLRA. 125
In keeping with this reasoning, the dissent offered its own plain
meaning of "prevailing party," arguing that a "lawsuit's ultimate
purpose is to achieve actual relief from an opponent .... [I]f a party
reaches the 'sought-after destination,' then the party 'prevails'
regardless of the 'route taken."" 26 The dissent also underscored the
Supreme Court's tendency to place "greatest weight not on any
'judicial imprimatur,' but on the practical impact of the lawsuit,"'2 7 a
tendency the dissent believed was clearly at odds with the majority's
stance.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND INCONSISTENCY IN DEFINING "PREVAILING
PARTIES" POST-BUCKHANNON

Part II outlines the basic debate over the merits of the Buckhannon
decision, and focuses on the case's impact on civil rights litigation in
federal and New York courts. Specifically, this part examines the
New York courts' inconsistent treatment of "prevailing parties" in the
wake of the Buckhannon decision.
A. General Ramifications of Buckhannon on Civil Rights Litigation
Directly following Buckhannon, defendants who had been ordered
to pay attorney's fees under the catalyst theory appealed where
1 28
possible, and some plaintiffs suffered a reversal of their fee awards.
Elsewhere, plaintiffs' lawyers offered to settle their cases at a
discount. 29 On one hand, the decision came as a relief to businesses
and government, who could now look forward to not only fewer
plaintiffs bringing civil rights lawsuits, but also reduced fee liability
when they do face suit. 3 ° On the other hand, the Buckhannon
decision has made it much more difficult for individuals to bring civil
rights litigation by enabling defendants to engage in strategic

124. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i).
125. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 629-30.
126. Id. at 634 (quoting Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1153
(5th Cir. 1985)).
127. Id. at 641-42; see also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (implying that
a plaintiff might still be entitled to fees "without [the] benefit of a formal judgment");
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (awarding fees without relying on a formal
judgment).
128. See Stanley, supra note 70, at 394 n.161-62.
129. Id. at 393 n.160 (citing Bob Van Voris, South Florida'sADA Industry Lawyer,
PartnersFile 740 Suits on Behalf of Disabled,Nat'l L.J., July 16, 2001, at Al).
130. Id. at 394-95.
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behavior, and deterring
civil rights lawyers from accepting potential
131

plaintiffs' cases.
Supporters of the decision argue that it will reduce litigation in a
number of ways. In the first place, Buckhannon will decrease the
number of frivolous suits filed by civil rights litigants who bring
illegitimate claims in the hopes of pressuring defendants to capitulate
in order to avoid paying attorney's fees and other litigation costs.132
Second, the bright line rule set forth by the Buckhannon decision will
either reduce or at least expedite fees-based litigation.'3 3 Third, some
"praise Buckhannon for encouraging settlements and fostering
'
predictability."134
These advocates of the decision explain that preBuckhannon, a defendant might have been liable for fees even after
settlement, so "it might have felt the odds
were better if it pushed
1 35
forward and vigorously defended the suit."'

Critics of Buckhannon, however, argue that defendants now have
the ability to string out litigation in an effort to force the plaintiff to
drop the case due to prohibitive costs.

136

Alternatively, defendants

may voluntarily change their contested policies when the plaintiff
seems on the verge of winning, thereby mooting the case, and
preventing the plaintiff from collecting attorney's fees or an
injunction.'3 7 Buckhannon opponents insist that the decision could
actually increase litigation because plaintiffs will insist on obtaining
consent decrees accompanying settlements, litigate to try to stop
courts from finding a case moot, and bring more actions for
damages. 38 Furthermore, detractors highlight the conflict of interests
civil rights plaintiffs' attorneys will face: they will be torn between
advising against settlement (and thereby risking payment), and truly
acting in their client's best interests. 3 9

131. Id. at 395-97.
132. Id. at 395 n.164 (citing Matthew D. Slater, Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Awards in Moot Cases, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 819, 823 (1982)).
133. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Fee-Shifting Fallout: In the Two Years Since the
Supreme Court Limited Catalyst Theory, Civil Rights Lawyers Find Themselves Torn
Between Losing Fees and Settling for Their Clients, 89 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (2003). An
employment defense lawyer observed that pre-Buckhannon, "[a] lot of the time, you
see cases where the merits are resolved and the only remaining issue is the amount of
attorneys fees-and sometimes that battle rages on long after the rest of the case is
finished." Id. at 58.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Stanley, supra note 70, at 395.
137. Id. Defense attorneys maintain that this is an unlikely scenario because few
defendants would spend the money or time to drop a case just before trial simply to
avoid paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Id. (citing Marcia Coyle, Fee Change Is a
Sea-Change But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices' Limit on Catalyst Theory Fees, Nat'l
L.J., June 11, 2001, at Al).
138. Id. at 396.
139. Tebo, supra note 133, at 57.
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B. The Federal Experience: Buckhannon's Impact on the Federal
Equal Access to Justice Act
Though Buckhannon only addressed specifically the FHAA and
ADA, its reach has been felt far beyond these statutes. The
Buckhannon Court affirmed that it interprets fee-shifting statutes
uniformly, 4 ' which has led many other courts to apply the
Buckhannon definition of "prevailing party" to fee-shifting statutes
other than the ADA and FHAA. However, while federal courts were
quick to extend Buckhannon to the Attorney's Fees Awards Act,'41

there was some uncertainty in extending it to the federal EAJA.
By and large, most federal courts extended Buckhannon to the
EAJA,' 42 but the Court of Federal Claims was a notable outpost of
resistance for a time. In Brickwood Contractors,Inc. v. United States
("Brickwood JJ"),143 the Court of Federal Claims denied the
government's appeal from a judgment awarding attorney's fees to a
plaintiff who had been deemed a "prevailing party" under the catalyst
theory, 1" refusing to apply Buckhannon to the EAJA 145 "on three
140. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001) (noting that "[w]e have interpreted these feeshifting provisions consistently"); see also Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164, 166
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating "the Supreme Court has recognized that the definition of
'prevailing party' does not differ from rule-to-rule or statute-to-statute").
141. J. Douglas Klein, Note, Does Buckhannon Apply? An Analysis of Judicial
Application and Extension of the Supreme Court Decision Eighteen Months After and
Beyond, 13 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 99, 110-11 (2002); see also N.Y. State Fed'n of
Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d 154,
158 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the § 1988 Attorney's Fees Awards Act,
and explaining that "[diespite the fact that the holding in Buckhannon applied to the
FHAA and ADA, it is clear that the Supreme Court intends the reasoning of the case
to apply to § 1988 as well"). For other cases extending Buckhannon to § 1988, see,
e.g., Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2002); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2001); Farley v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., No. Civ.A. 01-1294, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11390, at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 29, 2002); Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D.S.D. 2001); Booth
v. Barton County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Kan. 2001).
142. Thayer v. Principi, 46 Fed. Appx. 623 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying attorney's fees
after applying Buckhannon to the EAJA in Veterans Court); Perez-Arellano v.
Smith, 279 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying attorney's fees to a plaintiff who had
challenged an action by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and ultimately
secured naturalization, but failed to obtain an enforceable judgment or settlement
decree); Abiodun v. McElroy, No. 01-CV-0439, 2002 WL 31999342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2002) (denying attorney's fees under the EAJA where plaintiffs' claim was
dismissed as moot, although they ultimately received the relief sought, based on
Buckhannon); Miller v. Apfel, No. Civ.A. 300CV0107M, 2001 WL 1142763, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2001) (applying the Buckhannon standard to a Social Security
plaintiff seeking attorney's fees under the EAJA); J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch.
Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that private settlement does
not create a "prevailing party" for the purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act after Buckhannon).
143. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. C1. 738 (Fed. Cl. 2001)
[hereinafter Brickwood II].
144. See Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. C1. 148, 165 (Fed.
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alternative grounds:" (1) Buckhannon did not extend to the EAJA;
(2) even if it did, the Buckhannon holding was fact-specific, and its
facts were distinguishable from Brickwood's; and (3) in the event that
Buckhannon's holding and facts d[id]

apply to Brickwood, a

Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") hearing constituted the
46
necessary judicial imprimatur.'
The Brickwood II court contrasted the text of the EAJA with that
of the FHAA and ADA, and observed two important distinctions: (1)
147
the FHAA and ADA contained permissive fee-shifting language,
whereas the EAJA had mandatory fee-shifting language, 148 which

created a "presumption" of entitlement to fees for prevailing parties
absent from the other statutes; 149 and (2) neither the FHAA nor the

ADA contained "substantially justified" language, as the EAJA did. 5 °
Addressing the Buckhannon Court's concerns that the catalyst theory
would reward plaintiffs for "simply filing a nonfrivolous but

nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit,"''

the Brickwood II court

argued that "[t]he 'substantially justified' requirement of [the] EAJA
provides a safeguard to ensure that a plaintiff's victory had the
necessary legal merit to support an award of attorney's fees."'15 2 In the
alternative, the Brickwood II court adopted a more relaxed standard
for satisfying Buckhannon's standards, and argued that even if the
Cl. 2001) [hereinafter Brickwood I]. Plaintiff protested the Navy's attempt to convert
an Invitation for Bids into a Request for Proposals ("RFP"), a move which would
have displaced plaintiff as the lowest bidder. Brickwood 11, 49 Fed. Cl. at 740. After a
Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") hearing, the Navy issued Amendment 0009,
canceling its RFP. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed an EAJA application claim for
attorney's fees, which the court granted, finding plaintiff a "prevailing party" under
the catalyst theory because it had succeeded on a significant issue in the litigation
which had benefited the plaintiff. Brickwood 1, 49 Fed. Cl. at 156.
145. Brickwood H, 49 Fed. Cl. at 749-50.
146. Id. at 749.
147. The FHAA provides: "In a civil action under subsection (a) of this section,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000) (emphasis
added). Likewise, the ADA provides "In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. §
12205 (emphasis added).
148. The EAJA provides: "Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a
court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
expenses... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
149. Brickwood 11, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001)).
152. Id. at 747. The Brickwood II court further elaborated on the "substantially
justified" requirement, noting that it "directs the court to consider the merits of the
case underlying the EAJA application," and therefore, "takes pressure off the
'prevailing party' requirement." Id.
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new "prevailing party" definition applied to the EAJA, the court's
earlier examination of the merits during the TRO hearing
"represent[ed] the necessary 'judicial imprimatur' that caused the
change in the legal relationship of the parties."' 53
Less than a year later, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed Brickwood H, holding that the phrase
"prevailing party" should be interpreted in the same way under the
EAJA as under other fee-shifting statutes.154 The Brickwood III court
held that the Buckhannon standard for "prevailing party" extends to
fee-shifting statutes other than the ADA and FHAA despite differing
statutory language,'5 5 and that the lower court's comments during the
TRO hearing neither established the necessary judicial imprimatur,
nor constituted "a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of
the parties," as required by Buckhannon.5 6 According to the
Brickwood III court, although Buckhannon dealt specifically with the
FHAA and the ADA, it "also expressly cited to the Appendix to
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Marek v. Chesny, 157 which lists
over 100 federal fee-shifting statutes,"' 58 including the Equal Access to
Justice Act. 15 9 Furthermore, the Brickwood III court echoed
Buckhannon's reference to the Supreme Court's practice of
interpreting fee-shifting statutes consistently. 6 ° Since the resolution
of the Brickwood H split, some commentators perceive a consensus
"reached, not only among the circuits, but seemingly among litigants
as well,"'' that Buckhannon's "prevailing party" requirements apply
to the EAJA. 162

153. Cf. id. at 749. "[T]he court's remarks at the TRO hearing amounted to a
finding that the Navy had acted unlawfully, and the defendant's change in conduct
was a product of judicial action in the lawsuit." Id.
154. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter Brickwood III].
155. Id. at 1377-78.
156. Id. at 1380.
157. 473 U.S. 1 app. at 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Brickwood III, 288 F.3d at 1377 (citation omitted). According to the
Brickwood III court, the EAJA's legislative history "intended, overall, that the
meaning and interpretation of 'prevailing party' ... match and be consistent with its
construction and interpretation in other federal fee-shifting statutes." Id. at 1379.
Moreover, the court reasoned that the "substantially justified" prong indicates that
the bar for recovering attorney's fees was meant to be higher than other fee-shifting
statutes, but "application of the 'catalyst theory' ... would have the opposite result."
Id. at 1378.
159. Id. at 1377; see also Marek, 473 U.S. at 49.
160. Brickwood III, 288 F.3d at 1377.
161. Klein, supra note 141, at 109 (citing N.Y. State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v.
Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that both plaintiff and defendant "acknowledged that this reasoning has
become the law")).
162. Id.
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C. The JudicialImprimatur

Circuits are still split, however, on the question of what sort of relief
represents the necessary judicial imprimaturrequired by Buckhannon
to create a "prevailing party." In Buckhannon, the Court declared

that an operative judicial determination must include a "material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,"'63 and offered as

examples enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered
consent decrees,1" reasoning that "[a]lthough a consent decree does
not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it
nonetheless is a court-ordered 'chang[e] [in] the legal relationship
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant."' 165 The Court also

announced that private settlements did not embody the necessary
judicial imprimatur to establish a "prevailing party" because they did

not "entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent
decrees ' 166 (although it admitted previous recognition of private
settlements as grounds for awarding attorney's fees); 167 in most cases,
federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce private contractual
settlements "unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into

the order of dismissal."168 The lower federal courts have been left to
determine "where on this continuum a successful plaintiff will cease to
legally prevail."' 6 9
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits "have held that Buckhannon limits 'prevailing parties' to
parties who have received either a consent decree or final judicial
order on the merits. 1 7 Smyth v. Rivero,171 a Fourth Circuit case, is
163. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).
164. Id. Some commentators distinguish four broad categories of successful
plaintiff outcomes:
(1) [a] favorable judicial order on the merits[;] (2) [plrocuring a consent
decree[;] (3) [c]ontracting for a private settlement[; and] (4) [a] defendant's
voluntary cessation of the offensive action without a legal obligation to do so
(otherwise known as the "catalyst theory").... The Buckhannon decision
clearly settled any confusion as to whether categories (1) and (4) qualified as
"prevailing parties." However, appellate courts are puzzled as to the specific
type of judicial recognition Buckhannon requires before an award may be
granted to a successful plaintiff under categories (2) or (3). Inconsistent
appellate decisions have resulted from this uncertainty.
Klein, supra note 141, at 131 (citations omitted).
165. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Garland,489 U.S. at 792 (alterations in
original)).
166. Id. at 604 n.7.
167. Id. at 604.
168. Id. at 604 n.7 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375
(1994)).
169. Klein, supra note 141, at 132.
170. Id. at 134 (citation omitted).
171. 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002). In Smyth, plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action
against the Virginia Department of Social Services, arguing that the agency's
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representative of the majority of circuits' relatively narrow view of
consent decrees. There, the court held that merely obtaining a
preliminary injunction does not qualify a party as "prevailing,"' 7 2 and

set forth a strict standard for distinguishing between private
settlements and consent decrees: 73 A court must explicitly retain
jurisdiction and oversight over an agreement for an enforceable
settlement, i.e., a cognizable consent decree, to exist.174 Based on this
reasoning, the court denied plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees,

finding that neither the preliminary injunction nor the agreement
wherein the defendant would forgo repayment of certain benefits
constituted the necessary judicial imprimaturfor recovery of fees.'7 5

The Ninth and D.C. Circuits, along with the Northern District of
Florida, on the other hand, "have openly defied Buckhannon's

expansion of its 'catalyst theory' analysis into the realm of settlement

agreements."' 76 In Johnson v. District of Columbia,'77 the D.C. Circuit
requirement that recipients identify the fathers of their children before receiving
benefits violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (2000). Smyth, 282 F.3d
at 271. The district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the agency
from denying benefits to the plaintiffs. Id. at 272. The agency subsequently agreed to
not seek repayment of benefits paid to the plaintiffs prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
Id. at 273. The case was ultimately dismissed after the agency modified its policy so
that children born after 1996 need not identify their fathers, and the agency restored
the plaintiffs' benefits. Id.
172. The Smyth court found that the "preliminary, [and] incomplete nature of the
merits examination and the inter-play between the 'likely harms' and 'likelihood of
success' factors in the preliminary injunction inquiry" did not satisfy the prevailing
party requirement of § 1988. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277.
173. Id. at 281. Distinguishing consent decrees from settlements, the Smyth court
observed that "[a] consent decree, because it is entered as an order of the court,
receives court approval and is subject to the oversight attendant to the court's
authority to enforce its orders, characteristics not typical of settlement agreements."
Id. The court recognized, however, that "an order containing an agreement reached
by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to
which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such." Id.
174. Id. at 280-81. Relying on Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), the Smyth court concluded that, "[a] court's
responsibility to ensure that its orders are fair and lawful stamps an agreement that is
made part of an order with judicial imprimatur, and the continuing jurisdiction
involved in the court's inherent power to protect and effectuate its decrees entails
judicial oversight of the agreement." Smyth, 282 F.3d at 282 (emphasis added).
175. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 284. The agreement was not deemed part of the court's
order because the trial court neither retained jurisdiction nor compelled compliance
with the agreement. Id.
176. Klein, supra note 141, at 135; see Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d
1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting recovery of attorney's fees based on an enforceable
settlement); Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d
1272, 1279-80 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that because plaintiff's private settlement was
enforceable and the court compelled compliance with it, plaintiff was a "prevailing
party").
177. 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002). Plaintiffs claimed that the District of
Columbia Public Schools violated the fee-shifting provisions of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000), and the
Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), by including a waiver of
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declined to apply Buckhannon to private settlements, explaining "that
private settlements do constitute a material alteration in the legal
relationship between two parties sufficient to confer prevailing party
status," since a court with jurisdiction over an agreement can enforce
its terms. 178

Contrary to Smyth, Johnson maintained that a court's

oversight and approval of a settlement are "immaterial to whether
that settlement agreement is legally enforceable. 1

79

Thus, the

question of whether private settlements bear the necessary judicial
imprimaturfor recovering attorney's fees remains unsettled. 180
The Buckhannon Court's concern over federal courts' jurisdiction

to enforce private settlements, however, seems inappropriate with
respect to state courts. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.
of America,' the Court held that while federal courts do not

automatically retain jurisdiction to enforce private settlements unless
the parties explicitly stipulate for it or there is some independent basis
for federal jurisdiction, "enforcement of the settlement agreement is

for state courts."'8 2 Thus, it would seem that state courts do not face

the same jurisdictional problems that federal courts do in the

enforcement of private settlements.
D. Buckhannon's Impact on State Fee-Shifting Statutes
Several states have adopted the Buckhannon standard when
interpreting "prevailing party" language in their own statutes.18 3 For
attorney's fees in a settlement offer; the offer allegedly undermined plaintiffs' right to
counsel, as guaranteed by 28 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1). Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 36, 4142. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs were precluded from recovering based on
Buckhannon's rejection of private settlements as grounds for recovery of attorney's
fees. Id. at 40-45. The Johnson court rejected this argument, confining Buckhannon
to its facts. Id. at 44.
178. Id. at 45.
179. Id. at 45 n.3.
180. See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (explaining New York's
position on the significance of private settlements).
181. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
182. Id. at 381-82.
183. See, e.g., Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard's Dairy, 780 A.2d 916, 919 (Conn. 2001);
Taylor v. City of Lenoir, 558 S.E.2d 242 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Tibbetts v. Sight 'n
Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042 (Okla. 2003) (applying Buckhannon to the
attorney's fees provision of Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
15, §§ 751-763 (West 1993)); Direct Action for Rights v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651, 660
(R.I. 2003) (applying Buckhannon to Rhode Island's Access to Public Records Act,
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 538(2)(1)-538(2)(14) (1997)); cf. S&W Util. Contractors, Inc. v.
Rumbaugh, No. 25563-4-11, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 663, at *15-*16 (Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2002) (applying Buckhannon to Washington's common law rule that where both
parties are awarded relief, "the net affirmative judgment may determine the
prevailing party" (quoting Phillips Bldg. Co. v. An, 915 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996))). But see DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525 (Alaska 2002). The DeSalvo
court treated the catalyst theory as a viable justification of an award of attorney's fees
in the wake of Buckhannon, and remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether plaintiffs constituted "prevailing parties" under Alaska's Rule 82, which
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example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied Buckhannon's
standard for identifying a "prevailing party" pursuant to Connecticut
General Statute section 52-240(a), which provides attorney's fees in
product liability actions. "8 That court found that settlements for
which the court would enter judgment against the defendant for the
settlement amount "as upon default,"'8 5 created prevailing parties. 8 6
In Taylor v. City of Lenoir,'87 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
denied plaintiffs attorney's fees based on Buckhannon.'88 The Taylor
court concluded that although plaintiffs' suit may have contributed to
the city's voluntary change in conduct, the change "was not a legally
enforceable action required by judgment, or an order or a court
approved settlement of the trial court[, and therefore] ... plaintiffs do
not qualify as prevailing parties for purposes of awarding attorney's
'
In New York, however, courts have applied Buckhannon
fees."189
uncertainly and inconsistently.
E. The New York Experience: Buckhannon's Impact on New York's
Equal Access to Justice Act
Prior to Buckhannon, New York courts recognized the catalyst
theory, and applied it to both federal and state fee-shifting statutes. 90
For example, in Diaz v. Franco,9 ' the New York Appellate Division,
First Department, unanimously found that the plaintiff's action was
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the
prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees." Id. at 529 n.17
(quoting Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(a)); see also Graham v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., No.
B152928, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11318, at *16 (Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2002)
(deeming the catalyst theory a legitimate basis for recovering attorney's fees under
California's attorney's fee-shifting statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. 1021.5, in spite of
Buckhannon).
184. Wallerstein, 780 A.2d at 917. According to the statute, "[ilf the court
determines that the claim or defense is frivolous, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a products liability action." Id. at n.3
(discussing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240(a) (2003)).
185. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-194 (2003).
186. Wallerstein, 780 A.2d at 921.
187. 558 S.E.2d at 242.
188. Id. at 249. Plaintiffs attempted to recover attorney's fees based on North
Carolina's common fund doctrine, which provides that "a litigant or a lawyer who
recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole." Id. at 248 (quoting
Bailey v. North Carolina, 500 S.E.2d 54, 56 (N.C. 1998)). After Buckhannon, the
Taylor court held that "in order for the common fund doctrine to apply, the party
seeking an award of attorney's fees must be the prevailing party, and must show that
he has maintained a successful lawsuit." Id.
189. Id. at 249 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001)).
190. See, e.g., Dicent v. Wing, 724 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (App. Div. 2001) (deeming
plaintiff a prevailing party where "[p]etitioner obtained substantial relief and
succeeded in her goal when the City provided the accounting in its response to the
petition," just weeks before the Buckhannon decision).
191. 683 N.Y.S.2d 267 (App. Div. 1999).
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likely the catalyst behind the defendant's delayed review of plaintiff's
housing application, and accordingly awarded attorney's fees pursuant
to § 1988.192 The Appellate Division also applied the catalyst theory
to the New York EAJA, as demonstrated in Shvartszayd v.
Dowling,'9 3 where the First Department also unanimously awarded
attorney's fees to a plaintiff who had been wrongfully denied Social
Security benefits, finding that the Department of Social Services'
failure to comply with a reinstatement of benefits order was not
substantially justified. 94 In Centennial Restorations Co. v. Abrams,1 95
the Appellate Division, Third Department, deemed the petitioner a
prevailing party under the New York EAJA, where the plaintiff had
only achieved partial relief because the city's action "furthered
petitioner's interest and conferred an actual benefit upon it."' 96
Post-Buckhannon, New York courts have applied the new
"prevailing party" standard reluctantly and inconsistently.1 97 On the
one hand, in Auguste v. Hammons, 98 the New York Appellate
Division reversed a 1999 award for attorney's fees, specifically relying
1 99
on Buckhannon.
Shortly after the plaintiff, Henroit Auguste,
commenced an article 78 proceeding to protest the New York City
Department of Social Services' ("DSS") termination of his Medicaid
benefits, DSS restored them, and the New York Supreme Court
dismissed the proceeding as moot."°
The trial court considered
Auguste a "prevailing party" and awarded him attorney's fees? ° ' The
Appellate Division reversed, refusing to recognize Auguste as a
prevailing party under the catalyst theory; 12 the court concluded that
"[s]ince [the New York] Supreme Court did not issue an enforceable
judgment on the merits of petitioner's constitutional claims, there was

192. Id. at 267; see also Thomasel v. Perales, 578 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1991)
(awarding attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988 to plaintiffs who had entered into a
private settlement).
193. 656 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1997).
194. Id. at 631-32.
195. 608 N.Y.S.2d 559 (App. Div. 1994).
196. Id. at 560. Ultimately, however, the court denied plaintiff attorney's fees
because it found the government's position "substantially justified." Id. at 560-61.
197. Compare Auguste v. Hammons, 727 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 2001), with In re
Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2003), and Wright v. N.Y. State Office of
Children & Family Serv., No. 2002-5389, 2003 WL 21665633, at *2-*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 21, 2003).
198. 727 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The court noted that "[w]hile petitioner asserts that attorney's fees were
authorized because the filing of the petition was the 'catalyst' for the remedial action
taken by DSS, namely a restoration of his benefits, this theory of recovery has
recently been rejected by the United States Supreme Court [in Buckhannon]." Id.
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no material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties sufficient
to support an award of attorney's fees."2 °3
On the other hand, in a factually similar situation, in Wittlinger v.
Wing, the New York Court of Appeals specifically declined to rely on
Buckhannon.2 °4 Although the Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate
Division's denial of attorney's fees, instead of doing so on the basis of
Buckhannon, as the Appellate Division had, the court grounded its
denial of fees on a finding that the government's position was
"substantially justified.""2 5 Thus, it remains unclear whether the
catalyst theory permits recovery of fees under the New York EAJA. °6
Most recently, in Wright v. New York State Office of Children &
Family Services,"7 the New York Supreme Court for Erie County
again skirted the issue of the catalyst theory's remaining viability,
although it explicitly refused to follow Buckhannon's rejection of
private settlements as enforceable judgments. 8 In that case, the
plaintiff initiated an article 78 proceeding against the New York State
Office of Children and Family Services, Erie County Department of
Social Services, and New York State Central Register of Child Abuse
and Maltreatment, seeking an annulment of a maltreatment report
and an amendment of the report to reflect that the report was
unfounded. 2 9 After the plaintiff submitted her brief, counsel for the
State Office and State Register informed the appellate division that
they would administratively annul the maltreatment determination,
and subsequently submitted letters to the plaintiff advising her that
the administrative "hearing was cancelled and the determination
complained of would be expunged from the record., 210 When the
plaintiff requested attorney's fees, the defendants argued that in the
absence of any settlement, the plaintiff was left only with the nowdefunct catalyst theory.'
Without commenting on the applicability of
the catalyst theory, the court found that "[t]he signed writings by
Respondents' counsel in the two letters agreeing to Petitioner
203. Id.
204. In In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2003), the plaintiff also
sought attorney's fees based on DSS's restoration of public assistance benefits after
he had commenced an article 78 petition.
205. Id. at 1273-74 (concluding that based on its finding that the government's
position was substantially justified, it "need not reach the 'catalyst' issue and
Buckhannon's impact on the interpretation of the New York Equal Access to Justice
Act").
206. "The [Wittlinger] Court's ruling was a disappointment to advocates hoping for
a definitive answer.... The unanswered question is whether a complainant is entitled
to counsel fees if his legal action or threat of litigation is the catalyst for the result he
sought." Major Decisions from New York's High Court, N.Y. L. J., July 30, 2003, at
Al.
207. No. 2002-5389, 2003 WL 21665633, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2003).
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *1.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *2-*3.
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Wright's terms bind those Respondents pursuant to ordinary contract
law and CPLR Rule § 2104. 1212 The court went on to conclude that
the writings "manifest[ed] all of the necessary formalities for an
enforceable settlement agreement in New York. Hence, the State
Respondents' reliance213on the federal case law addressing legal catalyst
theory is misplaced.
The state defendants next argued that the plaintiff had not obtained
sufficient relief to be considered a prevailing party, relying on
Buckhannon's disapproval of private settlements as grounds for
recovery of fees.2 14 The Wright court dodged this point, stating that
Buckhannon's language concerning legal enforceability "only
provides guidance to the Court, and is itself dicta. Buckhannon...
did not involve a settlement of any sort."2'15 Based on the court's
previous conclusion that the defendant's correspondence was legally
enforceable, the court held that the plaintiff's settlement did not
implicate the catalyst theory, and did render her a prevailing party.216
The Wright court further justified its departure from Buckhannon
by highlighting differing language in the federal and state EAJAs.
While the federal EAJA2 17 defines "final judgment" as "a judgment
that is final and not appealable and includes an order of settlement,"218
the state EAJA 219 defines final judgment as "a judgment that is final
and not appealable, and settlement. ' 22' The Wright court concluded
that the New York legislature intended to "include those who
prevailed through settlement" as eligible applicants under the
EAJA, 221 arguing that "[b]y creating a more generous standard for
applicants than the federal statute, the state statute is not controlled
by the recent developments in the federal common law cutting away

212. Id. at *2. In relevant part, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104 (McKinney 2003) provides:
An agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an
action, other than one made between counsel in open court, is not binding
upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney or
reduced to the form of an order and entered.
Id.
213. Wright, 2003 WL 21665633, at *2.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *3.
216. Id. The Wright court explained that:
Given the Court's conclusion that Petitioner Wright obtained a signed,
written acceptance of her terms by the State Respondents, which the Court
finds legally bound them pursuant to CPLR 2104, the Court must also
conclude that this case falls on the other side of the line from the legal
catalyst cases, including Buckhannon, and Wittlinger v. Wing, precisely
because the agreement is legally enforceable.
Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (2000).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(c) (McKinney 2003).
220. Id. at 8602(c)(emphasis added).
221. Wright, 2003 WL 21665633, at *4.
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at the field of federal applicants. 2 22 Thus, New York courts have
treated Buckhannon's applicability to the New York EAJA in a
contradictory manner, and have, in some cases, openly defied its dicta.
This presents a crucial issue wherein the civil rights of our most
disadvantaged citizens hang in the balance.
III. STOPPING BUCKHANNON IN ITS TRACKS: BUCKHANNON DOES
NOT APPLY TO THE NEW YORK EAJA

New York courts have a critical opportunity to ensure meaningful
access to justice for the state's most vulnerable citizens. New York
would check unjustified governmental action by continuing to
recognize the catalyst theory, or in the alternative, at least recognizing
private settlements as bearing the judicial imprimatur necessary to
recover attorney's fees.
Part III of this Comment argues that Buckhannon ought not apply
to the New York EAJA, based on that case's limited holding, the
legislative intent of both the federal and state EAJAs, the textual
differences between the EAJAs and the FHAA and ADA, the textual
differences between the federal and New York EAJAs, and several
policy concerns.
A. The Limited Nature of the Buckhannon Holding
Given its limited holding, Buckhannon should not apply to the
federal or state EAJAs. The Buckhannon Court restricted its holding
to the FHAA and the ADA, and while it mentioned other fee-shifting
statutes throughout its opinion, these comments were clearly dicta.223
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court specifically reference the
federal EAJA, or any state versions.224 In short, Buckhannon does
not necessarily mandate the application of its holding to the EAJAs.225
222. Id.
223. Miller, supra note 30, at 1363; see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602-03 n.4; Brickwood II, 49
Fed. Cl. 738, 744 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (characterizing the Buckhannon Court's mention of
other fee-shifting statutes as dicta).
224. Miller, supra note 30, at 1363; see also Brickwood 11, 49 Fed. Cl. at 745 (noting
that "[t]he Buckhannon court also specifically listed three other statutes which have
been consistently interpreted with the two statutes at issue in Buckhannon, but the
EAJA statute was not mentioned in this list"); but see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603
(referencing the appendix to Justice Brennan's dissent in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
app. at 49 (1985) (Brennan., J., dissenting), which lists over 100 fee-shifting statutes,
including the EAJA, at number twenty-eight).
Several courts, however, have declined to apply Buckhannon to other statues listed
in Brennan's appendix. For example, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the
Central District of California, have all refused to apply Buckhannon to the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C § 1540(g)(4) (2000), which appears as number
twenty-two in Brennan's appendix. See Marek, 473 U.S. at app. 46 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla., 307 F.3d
1318, 1319, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d
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B. Legislative Intent
Furthermore, applying Buckhannon to the EAJAs would thwart the
basic legislative intent behind the acts. Congress intended that the
interpretation of "prevailing party" be "consistent with the law that
has developed under existing statutes. ' 2 6 At the time the federal
EAJA was enacted, the catalyst theory was a well-recognized part of
the relevant case law.227
Hence, the congressional intent to
incorporate the catalyst theory into the statute is a reasonable
inference, especially in light of Congress's explicit pronouncement
that "'prevailing party' should not be limited to a victor only after
228
entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits.
Indeed, Congress stated that "[a] party may be deemed prevailing if
he obtains a favorable settlement of his case, 229 and cited Foster v.
Boorstin,23 ° wherein the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
observed:
Surely the effectiveness of this incentive for persons of limited
means would be greatly diminished if the complainant were forced
to bear the expense of his attorneys' fees whenever the Government
chose to award the requested relief after a court action had been
filed but prior to a judgment or a court order.231
Such explicit endorsements of informal resolutions as sufficient for
recovering attorney's fees belie the Buckhannon
Court's
232
characterization of the legislative history as "ambiguous.,
Likewise, the New York Legislature intended the state EAJA to
improve "access to justice for individuals and businesses who may not
have the resources to sustain a long legal battle against an agency that
is acting without justification, ' 33 and specifically stipulated that the
statute be interpreted according to the case law developed under the
federal EAJA. 3

1077, 1080 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001); S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F.
Supp. 2d 944,947 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
225. Miller, supra note 30, at 1362.
226. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990.
227. Miller, supra note 30, at 1368.
228. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 11.
229. Id.
230. 561 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
231. Id. at 342.
232. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 607-08 (2001).
233. 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336.
234. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8600.
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C. Textual Differences Between the EAJAs and the FHAA and ADA
In addition to Buckhannon's limited holding and the directives set

forth by the legislative history, significant textual differences between
the EAJAs and the FHAA and ADA further counsel against
extending Buckhannon. In the first place, the EAJAs only permit

recovery when the government is not "substantially justified" in its

position, 35 unlike the FHAA and the ADA.236 The "'substantially
justified' prong... alleviates the concerns associated with a broad
definition that allows the catalyst theory." '37 This provision creates a
higher bar to recovery absent in the other two statutes.23 8 The EAJAs
also permit a court to deny fees "when special circumstances make an
award unjust," '3 9 whereas the FHAA and ADA do not. This language
considerably distinguishes the EAJAs from the FHAA and the ADA,
negating the necessity for applying Buckhannon.4 ° Basically, the
EAJAs' higher standard for recovery reduces the concern, expressed
by the Buckhannon Court, that courts will award undeserving
plaintiffs attorney's fees.241
D. Textual Differences Between the Federaland State EAJAs
Nevertheless, in the event that federal courts do continue to apply
Buckhannon to the federal EAJA, New York courts need not follow
suit because the New York EAJA is significantly distinguishable from
its federal counterpart. Indeed, the state EAJA goes beyond the
federal EAJA's standard for recovery by defining "prevailing party"
as "a plaintiff or petitioner in the civil action against the state who
prevails in whole or in substantialpart. 2 42 This is a significantly higher
threshold requirement than the federal EAJA, which only requires a

235. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)(2000). "[A] court shall award to a prevailing party
other than the United States fees and other expenses.., unless the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust." Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8601(a).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000) ("In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee,
including litigation expenses, and costs .. ");id. § 3613(c)(2) ("In a civil action under
subsection (a) of this section, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.").
237. Miller, supra note 30, at 1363 (citing Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738, 747 (Fed. Cl. 2001)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1363-64; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
240. See Miller, supra note 30, at 1363-64.
241. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
242. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(f) (McKinney 2003) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff to succeed on "any significant issue" or receive "some of the
benefit" sought from the lawsuit.24 3
Furthermore, the New York EAJA places more restrictions on
eligible parties than the federal EAJA: New York's EAJA only
allows plaintiffs "who have a net worth of less than $50,000 (excluding
the value of their primary residence)," "owners of businesses with
fewer than 100 employees," and charitable "not-for-profit
corporations" to recover attorney's fees. 24 In contrast, the federal
EAJA
defines an eligible party more expansively than the State EAJA:
"(i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the
time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an
unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation,
association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth
of which did not exceed $7,000,000." 245
These textual differences indicate that New York's EAJA forces
plaintiffs to meet a higher "prevailing" threshold, and only applies to
more economically challenged litigants, as compared to the federal
EAJA.
24 6
Though in New York Clinical LaboratoryAss'n, Inc. v. Kaladjian,
the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the state
"Legislature's departure from the Federal EAJA... evinces an intent
to impose a stricter standard for demonstrating prevailing party status
under the State EAJA than under its Federal counterpart, ' 247 this
Comment shows that these heightened restrictions actually mitigate
the necessity for applying Buckhannon.
According to the
Buckhannon Court, one of the primary concerns associated with the
catalyst theory was that "a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees if it
established that the 'complaint had sufficient merit to withstand a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.' ' 248 Examining the level of success
required to be a "prevailing party," the New York ClinicalLaboratory
court ruled that it would only regard a plaintiff as a prevailing party if
it "can show that it succeeded in large or substantial part by
identifying the original goals of the litigation and by demonstrating
249
the comparative substantiality of the relief actually obtained.,
243. In re N.Y. State Clinical Lab. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kaladjian, 649 N.E.2d 811, 815
(N.Y. 1995) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
244. 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336; see also N.Y.ClinicalLab., 649 N.E.2d at 815.
245. N.Y. Clinical Lab., 649 N.E.2d at 815 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)

(2000)).
246. Id. at 811.
247. Id. at 814.
248. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 27
(No. 99-1848)).
249. N.Y. ClinicalLab., 649 N.E.2d at 815.

2004]

BUCKHANNON AND THE NEW YORK EAJA

1373

Under New York's EAJA, it is unlikely that an unworthy plaintiff
would collect fees, because a litigant could not recover without
meeting the burden of demonstrating the substantiality of the relief as
compared with the goals of the litigation.2 0 Hence, New York's
exacting scrutiny over the level of success plaintiffs must demonstrate
before becoming entitled to attorney's fees makes it unnecessary to
apply Buckhannon.
Furthermore, although the New York Clinical Laboratory court
identified some legislative history evidencing concern over limiting
the award of attorney's fees,251 the heightened restrictions that were
enacted because of these reservations specifically accommodate the
catalyst theory's broader scope of recovery.25 2 Indeed, then-Governor
Cuomo and then-Attorney General Robert Abrams, both of whom
had opposed bills with similar purposes in the past, acknowledged that
the New York EAJA contained sufficient restraints on attorney's fees
awards, and supported its passage.2 3 The New York EAJA's
distinctive provisions alleviate the need to further guard against
awarding fees to undeserving plaintiffs. In light of the legislative and
executive pronouncements that the New York EAJA contains
adequate checks on fee-shifting, it is unnecessary to apply
Buckhannon as a further restriction on the state EAJA.
E. Policy Reasons
Aside from the several legal reasons cited above, significant policy
concerns also caution against applying Buckhannon to the New York
EAJA.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 814-15. In approving the bill, the Governor stated that "a program of
providing recompense for the cost of correcting official error is highly desirable as
long as it is limited to helping those who need assistance, it does not deter State
agencies from pursuing legitimate goals and it contains adequate restraint on the
amount of fees awarded." Id. (quoting 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336) (emphasis
omitted)).
252. Memorandum from Governor Cuomo, reprintedin 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336.
253. See id. Governor Cuomo noted that "this bill ... is different" from previous
bills with similar purposes, which had been disapproved due to (1) appropriate
limitations on eligibility; (2) the "substantially justified" prong, which will not deter
good faith agency action; and (3) limits on when and how much attorney's fees may
be awarded. Id.; see also Memorandum from Attorney General Abrams, to Governor
Cuomo, reprinted in 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336. The attorney general noted that the
New York EAJA "has been carefully crafted to meet many of the objections which
have resulted in the disapproval of [similar] bills in previous years.... I have no legal
objection to the bill." Letter from Attorney General Robert Abrams, reprinted in
1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336.
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1. The Need to Provide Access to Justice for New York's Indigent

Citizens
The problem of legal underrepresentation among New York's most
vulnerable citizens is a well-documented, but as yet unmitigated,
phenomenon.254 In her most recent report on the state of the
judiciary, Chief Judge Judith Kaye observed that "study after study
has found we are meeting only a small percentage of the civil legal

needs of the poor. '255 She stressed the importance of ensuring that
underprivileged individuals' "entitlement to equal justice is not
thwarted by lack of money, and surely not by barriers erected by the
courts themselves., 256 By refusing to apply Buckhannon to the state
EAJA, New York courts can "remove one such court-imposed barrier
to access to justice, and ...stem any further erosion in available legal
services to this woefully underserved population., 25 7 By recognizing
the catalyst theory as applied to the state EAJA, New York courts will
come one step closer to legitimizing the premise that all people are
equal before the law. 58

2. Private Attorneys General Rationale
The federal EAJA, upon which the State EAJA is modeled,

specifically stressed that its role was to encourage private enforcement

of public policy by compensating private attorneys general. 25 9 To

realize the private attorneys general rationale, Congress enacted the
federal EAJA to expand governmental liability for fees. 2 6° This
private attorneys general rationale is absent from both the FHAA and
the ADA,261 and it is therefore inappropriate to extend Buckhannon
to the EAJA.
"A broader definition of prevailing party than
254. See Report to the Chief Judge of the Legal Services Project, Funding Legal
Services for the Poor 3 (May 1998) (asserting that the "unmet need for critical legal
services among poor New Yorkers has been thoroughly documented, is very great and
is worsening"); Preliminary Report of Committee to Improve the Availability of
Legal Services (June 30, 1989) (reporting that "there is an imbalance of crisis
proportions between the.., unmet need for civil legal services among the poor...
and the legal resources now available to address it.").
255. Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, The State of the Judiciary 2002, at 11 (January 14,
2002), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/StofJud2002.pdf.
256. Id. at 6.
257. Brief of Amicus Curiae NYSBA at 6, In re Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d
1270 (N.Y. 2003) (No. 2003-0005).
258. Final Report of the Pro Bono Review Committee, at 46 (Apr. 18, 1994).
259. See EAJA, 96 Pub. L. No. 481, § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980); EAJA, H.R.
Rep. No. 96-1418 (1980), at 9-10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990.
The purpose of the New York EAJA is "[t]o encourage individuals, small businesses,
and not-for-profit corporations to challenge state action when it lacks substantial
justification by allowing them to recover fees and litigation expenses." Memorandum
from the New York State Assembly in Support of Legislation, reprinted in 1989 N.Y.
Legis. Ann. 336.
260. Miller, supra note 30, at 1364.
261. Id.
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Buckhannon's conception is more consistent with the expansion of
liability for attorney's fees that Congress sought to achieve under the
262
EAJA."
Moreover, it is only fair to compensate private citizens for efforts
that bring about favorable changes for society as a whole.263 Indeed,
Congress stated that "the expense of correcting error on the part of
the Government should not rest wholly on the party whose willingness
to litigate [or] adjudicate has helped to define the limits of Federal
authority. ' '26 Thus, allowing Buckhannon to reach the EAJAs would
have the very effect the statute intended to prevent.
3. Government Party
Unlike the FHAA and ADA, the state and federal EAJAs only
apply to suits involving the government.2 65 Due to the government's
size, greater resources, and expertise, private plaintiffs may be
daunted from initiating litigation against it.2 66 Because the EAJAs
only apply to parties in suit against the government, and the
government has superior resources, Justice Scalia's argument in
Buckhannon that the catalyst theory can harm "less-well heeled"
parties on either side of the litigation 267 is unfounded. This is
especially true under the New York EAJA, where individual plaintiffs
must have a net worth of less than $50,000 to recover attorney's
fees. 26
Applying Buckhannon to the EAJAs would create yet another
disincentive to bringing suit against the government because the
"government could moot cases by voluntarily changing its
behavior. '269 The stronger the merits of a case, the more likely the
government would change its behavior, thereby discouraging plaintiffs
with the most meritorious cases, but the fewest financial resources,
27 °
from bringing suit.
Furthermore, citizen suits against the sovereign function as an
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1367.
264. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 10.
265. Miller, supra note 30, at 1364.
266. Id. at 1365 nn.141-42.
267. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 620 (Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that "the catalyst theory
also harms the 'less well-heeled defendants,' putting pressure on them to avoid the
risk of massive fees by abandoning a solidly defensible case early in litigation").
268. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(d) (McKinney 2003).
269. Miller, supra note 30, at 1366.
270. The New York EAJA only allows recovery for plaintiffs who have a net worth
of less than $50,000 (excluding the value of their primary residence), owners of
businesses with fewer than 100 employees, and not-for-profit corporations. See 1989
N.Y. Legis. Ann. 336. In fact, New York's net worth cap is the lowest out of all the
state EAJAs, ensuring that only the most underprivileged litigants may take
advantage of fee-shifting. See Olson, supra note 40, at 562.
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important check on government. 271 These suits deter improper
government actions, allow private citizens to protect their own
interests, and achieve important public policy goals.2 72 Significantly,
the drafters of the New York EAJA voiced their concern that the
government could, with its greater resources, "coerce compliance with
its position. '273
Indeed, the New York State Bar Association
("NYSBA") has reported that the greatest problem plaguing
indigents' assertion of their rights is "inadequate performance of local
social services districts and the inadequate supervision of those
districts" by the DSS.27 4 In 1988, the NYSBA found that "[m]ore than
half of all fair hearings [were] conducted [against the DSS],... [but
the actions of the DSS were] affirmed in only 11% of the cases in
1986. "275 This means that it is likely that some local agencies did not
follow the law in almost 90% of the cases.276 More recent reports
indicate that local agency compliance with laws remains a problem
today: In 1998, the New York City Comptroller reported that local
agencies failed
to comply with fair order hearings in almost a quarter
277
of all cases.
Permitting plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees under the New York
EAJA via the catalyst theory is essential to check unfair governmental
action. "[I]f state agencies become aware that citizens, no matter how
poor, will have access to legal assistance in seeking... redress, 27a8
closer adherence to statutory obligations may be expected.
Without the catalyst theory, courts will "unintentionally sanction
2' 79
governmental misbehavior by removing any financial penalty for it.
4. Impact on Attorneys
Extending Buckhannon to the EAJAs would not only make filing
suit against the government prohibitively expensive for most private
litigants, but it would also complicate the task of finding a lawyer. It
would discourage civil rights attorneys from taking up the more
meritorious cases, because, as noted above, these are precisely the
ones in which the government could voluntarily change its behavior,
thereby mooting attorneys out of fees. 280 Attorneys working on a
contingency basis would be torn between advising settlement in order
271. Miller, supra note 30, at 1366.
272. Id.
273. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4988.
274. Brief of Amicus Curiae NYSBA at 12, In re Wittlinger (No. 2003-0005).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 12-13.
The Comptroller declared that rates of non-timely
compliance with fair order hearings ranged between 10-24%. Id. at 13.
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id. at 15.
280. See Tebo, supra note 133, at 57.
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to ensure payment of fees, and going to trial, where fees would not be
assured. 8
Furthermore, reports show that, for many attorneys working in
small to mid-size law firms, it is not feasible to engage in poverty law
unless there is some kind of remuneration. 2
The bulk of poverty
lawyers' fees comes from stipulated settlements, entered into after the
government has taken corrective action.8 3 If Buckhannon is applied
to the New York EAJA and the catalyst theory is disavowed, these
attorneys will lose the greater share of their fees because the
government will be able to take corrective action without paying for
the expense of litigating its erroneous behavior .2 8'
This would
discourage, and probably financially prohibit, many lawyers from
making the large investments of time and resources necessary to
become familiar with and litigate in most poverty law areas.2 5
F. Private Settlements Bear the Necessary JudicialImprimatur
In the alternative, if New York courts insist on applying
Buckhannon to the New York EAJA, they should at least recognize
private settlements as a basis for recovering attorney's fees. Recovery
of fees is crucial for enabling poverty lawyers to take on low-income
civil rights litigants' causes, and often determines the degree of access
litigants will have to counsel.286
The Buckhannon Court's concerns about the lack of federal
jurisdiction to enforce private agreements,28 7 as articulated in
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,288 are totally
inapplicable in the state court context.
Kokkonen explicitly
acknowledged that state courts do not need special jurisdiction to
enforce settlements. 89 New York's own court, in Wright v. New York
State Office of Children & Family Services,29 ° ventured as much by
ruling that mere correspondence between parties could create a
281. Id.
282. See The Marrero Committee Report (1980), (on file with Victor Marrero Esq.
and at the Brooklyn Law School Library).
283. Brief of Amicus Curiae Carole A. Burns & Assoc. at 7, In re Wittlinger (No.
2003-0005).
284. See id. at 9.
285. See id. (describing how the Carole A. Burns & Assoc. firm's tentative efforts
to create a poverty law practice group were frustrated by Buckhannon); Brief of
Amicus Curiae NYSBA at 8, In re Wittlinger (No. 2003-0005) (observing that "a
private attorney must decide whether the mammoth investment of time and effort
carries with it a reasonable chance of fair compensation").
286. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Carole A. Burns & Assoc. at 7, Wittlinger (No.
2003-0005).
287. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
288. 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
289. Id.
290. No. 2002-5389, 2003 WL 21665633, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2003).
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material alteration of their legal relationship under basic contract
principles,
satisfying
Buckhannon's
judicial
imprimatur
requirement.2 91
The federal and New York EAJAs' differing definitions of "final
judgment" further support awarding fees to claimants under the state
version without a consent decree attached to a settlement. The New
York EAJA permits recovery after "a judgment that is final and not
appealable, and settlement, '29 2 as opposed to an "order of
settlement" 9 3 as the federal EAJA requires. The state version's
exclusion of "order of" suggests that a party who obtains something
less than a judicially-sanctioned agreement can still be considered a
"prevailing party" under the New York EAJA, and New York courts
need not construe the judicial imprimatur as narrowly as cases like
Smyth v. Rivero.294 Ultimately, a more expansive construction of
Buckhannon's judicial imprimaturrequirement constitutes the correct
compromise between achieving a consistent interpretation of
"prevailing party" fee-shifting statutes, encouraging settlement, and
permitting plaintiffs to recover fees.
CONCLUSION

New York courts must not apply the Supreme Court's rejection of
the catalyst theory in Buckhannon to the New York EAJA. The
drafters of the Act intended to expand the government's liability for
attorney's fees in order to facilitate access to justice for disadvantaged
litigants, and adequately addressed the competing concern of
hampering legitimate governmental action by adding heightened
restrictions on eligibility and recovery.29 5
These restrictions
accommodate the catalyst theory's broader principle of recovery.296 In
light of the significant burdens a disavowal of the catalyst theory will
add to the problem of the underrepresentation of the poor, as well as
the valuable check on illegal governmental activity society at large will
lose, Buckhannon cannot pertain to the New York EAJA.297
In the alternative, if New York courts insist on applying
Buckhannon, they must recognize private settlements as a valid
enforceable judgment because the Buckhannon Court's rationale for
disapproving of private settlement simply does not apply in a state
court context, and there is statutory support for distinguishing the
New York EAJA from the federal version. 98 Permitting recovery
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8602(c) (McKinney 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (2000).
282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002).
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.F.
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based on private settlement is the last door open to underprivileged
litigants trying to assert their civil rights, and if courts close it, New
York's most vulnerable will be left out in the cold.

Notes & Observations

